tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post8362346628625574539..comments2023-06-19T04:35:06.263-07:00Comments on Skeptic's Play: Beliefs are moralmillerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-41996980942396065442015-03-16T15:17:41.871-07:002015-03-16T15:17:41.871-07:00Yeah, on one level I agree. Some amount of force ...Yeah, on one level I agree. Some amount of force (often in the form of shaming or appealing to emotion) seems essential to the moral character of an argument. On the other hand, this seems at odds with the thesis of my post, which is that it is morally correct to hold correct beliefs--even when our only response to an incorrect belief is rational persuasion. I do not, for instance, find it useful to shame deists, but would try to persuade them otherwise.<br /><br />I think we might be working with two definitions of morality. The first simply describing what we "ought" to do. The second describing the things that are best addressed with our moral apparatus (using shame, reputation, and "justice" as necessary). Beliefs are moral in the first sense, but not always in the second sense.<br /><br />Perhaps one way to phrase it is that beliefs are always ethical and sometimes moral.millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-46898107719376983092014-06-25T03:13:16.348-07:002014-06-25T03:13:16.348-07:00Much hinges on what you mean by "persuasive m...Much hinges on what you mean by "persuasive means." For example, I find the state's threats to imprison or kill me quite persuasive, but this is not, I think, what you have in mind.<br /><br />What I mean by "force" is something other than imparting the relevant facts and integrating those facts by some canonical, agreed-upon method, i.e. propositional calculus or the scientific method (broadly construed).<br /><br />You can argue the evidence and the scientific method till you're blue in the face, and the vast majority of creationists will not change their minds. Some will, but those are precisely the ones who do not need moral persuasion. The rest are not mistaken, they have made a moral choice to look at the world in a way that you say (and I agree) is morally wrong. They will not change their moral choice just because you have made a different choice.<br /><br /><i>I was actually making an overly glib comment referring to, for instance, Thunderf00t. Or Bill Maher, say.</i><br /><br />I understood to whom you were referring. It's a glib comment, but even your glib comments have a lot of meat on on them. Of course, Thunderf00t and Bill Maher make epistemic errors, as do we all, but I think their emphasis on the use of mockery is not especially related to any errors they might make. They're simply using a particular means of force to back up their moral belief. And I think their tactic is very helpful - mockery in general is, I think, very effective in general in changing social behavior.millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-79301745121601952492014-06-24T22:43:42.307-07:002014-06-24T22:43:42.307-07:00Yeah... it makes more sense to me to think of the ...Yeah... it makes more sense to me to think of the normativity of beliefs deriving from the normativity of facts, not the other way around. If behaving a certain way causes pain but does not cause anyone to belief falsehoods, how can we say it is wrong in that system?millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-60049636397945940972014-06-24T22:38:48.448-07:002014-06-24T22:38:48.448-07:00I was actually making an overly glib comment refer...I was actually making an overly glib comment referring to, for instance, Thunderf00t. Or Bill Maher, say. They don't really exclusively use mockery, and pinpointing their epistemological errors is probably nontrivial.<br /><br />I think the idea that moral norms require some kind of "force" is an interesting one to me. But I would also consider it a moral norm even if we chose to "force" it purely by persuasive means.millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-33560866201101527962014-06-24T20:26:44.388-07:002014-06-24T20:26:44.388-07:00Skeptics who exclusively use mockery to attack Cre...<i>Skeptics who exclusively use mockery to attack Creationists are incidentally correct. That's not good enough, because now I can't rely on them to, you know, have any correct beliefs outside of skepticism.</i><br /><br />I disagree. First, no one <i>exclusively</i> uses mockery. But some people do use a <i>mostly</i> mockery.<br /><br />Essential to normativity is "force." If I say I believe that X is a normative principle, then I'm saying I will use some kind of "force" to make you do X, even if you don't want to. Force does not necessarily entail physical violence, but it does entail something other than rational persuasion, such as mockery. Two people can be aware of all the relevant facts, agree on some canonical method for integrating those facts, and still disagree on what is <i>good</i>. A moral norm with no <i>enforcement</i> at all is no moral norm; it is just a differing preference.<br /><br /><br />I don't think creationists care that they're not using canonical reasoning. If we truly believe they are wrong, we have to use some sort of force, such as mockery, to change their behavior.millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9124539381685751273.post-79605673034840874072014-06-24T16:42:57.547-07:002014-06-24T16:42:57.547-07:00I read you to be applying the normativity of moral...I read you to be applying the normativity of morality to the truth of beliefs, but this does remind me of another possible position that I've always enjoyed: that the "should"/"wrongness" (or normativity) of morality is derived from the "wrongness" (or normativity) of truth/falsehood. I run in to this a lot when I attempt to make Kantian arguments, or just generally bootstrap morality from nothing (or more reasonably, bootstrap morality from some kind of normativity in non-contradiction). Of course I've never been satisfied with those arguments (after all, to make a complex and satisfying moral system from almost meaningless premises should be impossible), but it is fun to do.<br /><br />So basically I've always entertained a belief that would agree with you for a different reason- beliefs are moral because the normativity of morality is just the normaitivty of beliefs and nothing more.millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05990852054891771988noreply@blogger.com