Following my retrospective on the ontological argument, I just remembered another thing I always thought was funny about it. According to the argument, part of God's definition is that God necessarily exists. But why?
I can just imagine, what if there were some powerful being which shared every property with God, except for the necessary existence. That is, this being is exactly like God in every way, except that unlike God, it only exists in our world, not every possible world. By definition, this being would not be God. After all, it's not the greatest being imaginable. We can imagine a being that is greater: one that exists in every possible world, not just ours.
But a fine distinction that would be if in our world, we're being subjugated/loved/ignored by an all-powerful and vengeful/benevolent/passive being! I don't know about you, but I'd call that thing a god, even if it doesn't quite fit the definition in the ontological argument. As for those other possible worlds where the being doesn't exist, who cares about 'em? Depending on who you ask, there isn't even any metaphysical significance to the other possible worlds, they're just ideas.
That leaves the ontological argument in a funny position. The god it argues for does not necessarily have any of the properties we normally assign to a god. But it does have this extra property, necessary existence, which I do not think is necessary to qualify a being as a god. Does it really have anything to do with gods, or is it just a logical game, as I've been treating it? (Also applies to nearly every other philosophical argument for gods.)
And yes, I do have some idea of how ontological argument proponents would respond. A transcendent being such as a god must also transcend all possible worlds, thus necessary existence is an inseparable quality of God. But if we understand other possible worlds as mere ideas, this doesn't make any sense.